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BOOK REVIEWS 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY: AN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
RICHARD ANTE* 
SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE. By JOHN BOSWELL. 
New York: Villard Books. 1994. Pp. 412. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe is a scholarly attempt which, 
through an examination of Western history, proposes that same-sex 
marriage existed in classical and medieval cultures, and, indeed, is part 
of the same Western culture which now excludes it.I Controversial as 
it may sound, more important to this history than the discovery of 
same-sex unions in the Western tradition is the book's underlying 
argument that marriage is a socially, not naturally, constructed institu-
tion, tailored to fit society's needs, mores, and beliefs.2 With this strong 
argument, the modern world is called on to reexamine its belief that 
marriage is by definition an opposite-sex partnership.3 Such a belief 
may indeed be misplaced, if not downright erroneous, given the his-
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
1 See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 53-107,199-279 (1994). 
2 See William N. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1421-22, 1485 
(1993). Eskridge uses social constructionist history to evaluate the constitutional arguments for 
and against same-sex marriage. [d. In his representation of the two gay men in Dean v. District of 
Columbia, he amassed historical and cross-cultural evidence of socially and religiously approved 
same-sex marriages, spanning all continents, including premodern Europe. See No. 90-13892, 
1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct.June 2, 1992), affd, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. 1995) (holding that 
same-sex couples do not have legal right to marry); Nancy D. Polikoff, Comment, We Will Get 
What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not ''Dismantle the Legal Structure 
of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1537-38 (1993). Eskridge's research is 
independent of that conducted by Boswell for Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe and may be 
found in Eskridge, supra. 
3 See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1485, 1496. 
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torical evidence that societies define marriage, and therefore may in 
the future define marriage in any number ofways.4 That is, there is no 
such thing as an essential definition of marriage.5 
Notwithstanding the weight of its mission, Same-Sex Unions in 
Premodern Europe succeeds in challenging, if not ultimately decon-
structing, the reader's gender-based notion of matrimony. The author, 
John Boswell,6 embarks on this difficult task by delineating a persuasive 
historical account, stretching from the Greco-Roman world to the rise 
of the Christian Church in the early Middle Ages.7 The book is heavily 
researched, deserving of one who previously chaired Yale University's 
history department, and Boswell's findings draw from original texts as 
well as the discoveries of other historians, sociologists, and anthropolo-
gists.8 In some instances, Boswell offers revision and criticism of the 
work of some previous historians, noting their failure to clarify and 
interpret evidence pointing to the existence of same-sex unions.9 In-
deed, he finds compelling support for his historical account in early 
Christian texts describing nuptial rites and ceremonies for same-sex 
couples.1o His book gives a sampling of these rites, such as Grottaferrata 
r.~ VII, which dates back to the tenth century,ll and offers a fascinating 
glimpse into the practices of an era from which Western culture re-
ceived a significant part of its tradition.12 
Boswell divides his book into chapters that, in turn, layout the 
history of heterosexual marriage and same-sex unions in the Greco-
Roman world and in Medieval Europe, and offer a comparison of the 
nuptial traditions for both kinds of unions.13 This method allows the 
4 See id. at 1493-94. 
5 See id. at 1485. 
6 The author is the late A. Whitney Griswold Professor of History at Yale University. He died 
at age 47 from AIDS complications on Christmas Eve in 1994. John Boswel~ S.F. CHRoN.,Jan. 12, 
1995, at C3. Boswell gained national recognition with the publication in 1980 of his first book, 
Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality, which unearthed 1,500 years of gay history in 
Western Europe from the time of Jesus to the 15th century. Id. It received the American Book 
Award for history in 1981. Id. Boswell wrote that one major goal of his work was "to rebut the 
common idea that religious belief---Christian or other-has been the cause of intolerance in 
regard to gay people." Id. Boswell was born in Boston and received his doctorate in history from 
Harvard University. Id. 
7 See BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 53-107,218--61 (chapters 3 and 7, respectively). 
8 See, e.g., id. at 80-83, 178-79, 267-70. 
9Id. at 270-79. 
10 E.g., id. at 291-306 (appendix of translations of Greek and Old Church Slavonic offices, 
nuptials, and prayers for same-sex unions). 
11 Id. at 291-94. 
12 See id. at 262-73. 
13 See generaUy id. at 53-107, 162-217 (chapters 3, "Same-Sex Unions in the Greco-Roman 
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reader to understand the nature of marriage as it existed then, what 
its purpose was, and how the Christian Church's philosophy on mar-
riage developed.14 The insight into history alone is invaluable, and yet 
it is also crucial to examine the contribution such historical evidence 
may make to the legal arguments advancing same-sex marriages in the 
United States. This Book Review examines how Boswell's work shapes 
some of these arguments. Part II begins by outlining the background 
of the current legal battle for legitimization of same-sex marriages. Part 
III summarizes Boswell's historical evidence. Part IV discusses the im-
plications of such evidence to the constitutional arguments for same-
sex marriage, applying the social constructionist view15 to a functional 
interpretation of marriage, the courts' procreation rationale, the anal-
ogy of same-sex marriage to miscegenation, and the moral tradition 
argument advanced by opponents of same-sex marriage. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Opponents of same-sex marriage have always argued that the 
notion is an oxymoron.16 In fact, court opinions have consistently cited 
this rationale for refusing to recognize a fundamental right for same-
sex couples to be legally married. 17 Beginning in 1971, when the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota ruled that same-sex couples have no legal right to 
marry because marriage is and always has been an inherently hetero-
World"; 5, ''The Development of Nuptial Offices"; and 6, "Comparison of Same-Sex and Hetero-
sexual Ceremonies of Union"). 
14 See ill. at 28-52, 108-61 (chapters 2 and 4, respectively). 
15 According to social constructionist theory, society does not discover the one true definition 
of marriage, but rather continually contructs it over time, based on changing attitudes, mores, 
and social relations. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1432-34. Social constructionist theory, then, as 
opposed to essentialist theory, does not propose a definition of marriage that is resistant to time, 
preferring to view marriage as something that evolves, depending on the types of relationships 
society chooses to value. Id. But see Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a ''Postmodern" Gay 
Culture: Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POUTICS AND 
SOCIAL 'THEORY 105 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) ("[T]he new sociology and history of same-sex 
intimacies has been narrowly focused on the social origin and development of lesbian and gay 
male identities and communities among almost exclusively white, middle-<:lass Europeans or 
Americans. "). 
16 Eskridge, supra note 2, at 142l. 
17 See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (affirming state's 
refusal to issue marriage license to two men); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1973) (upholding denial of marriage license to same-sex couple); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (upholding state statute denying marriage license to same-sex 
couples); Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *1-*2 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
June 2, 1992), afrd, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. 1995) (holding that same-sex couples do not have 
legal right to marry). See also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that federal immigration law excludes same-sex marriages for citizenship purposes). 
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sexual institution, "a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the 
procreation and rearing of children, "18 courts in the United States have 
affirmed the idea that same-sex couples are precluded from marrying 
because of the nature of the institution of marriage itself.19 As Ken-
tucky's highest court observed, after quoting extensively from diction-
aries and an encyclopedia: "It appears to us that appellants are pre-
vented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal 
of the County Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but 
rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that 
term is defined. "20 
The courts seem to have rung the death knell of same-sex mar-
riage as a matter of state substantive right.21 Considering the United 
States Supreme Court's refusal to extend constitutional protection to 
sexual liberty involving same-sex partners in the infamous Bowers v. 
Hardwick decision,22 and the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Congress 
could not have intended that same-sex marriage would satisfy immi-
gration law requirements,23 the case law seems to signal a defeat for 
proponents of same-sex unions.24 
Whether this defeat is conclusive is up for debate. On the one 
hand, courts deny that same-sex marriage is a matter of fundamental 
constitutional right.25 Yet on the other hand, they have nonetheless 
recognized gay and lesbian relationships and legitimized them in cer-
tain settings.26 Legal alternatives to marriage have become available to 
gay and lesbian couples through quasi-marital structures like domestic 
partnership, contracts, and adult adoption.27 These arrangements have 
18 Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
19 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
20 jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589. 
21 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
22 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 u.s. 186, 192 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of Georgia's 
sodomy law and holding that right to privacy does not prevent states from criminalizing same-sex 
sexual activity). Hardwick has received some harsh criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Evan 
Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Courts Go in After 
Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 997, 1041 (1994); 
Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1523 n.30 (1989). 
23 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039, 1042 (holding that even if same-sex marriage were recognized 
by state law, Congressional intent still foreclosed granting of citizenship to same-sex spouses as 
matter of federal immigration law). 
24 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
25 See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). 
26 See Edward J. Juel, Note, Non-Traditional Family Values: Providing Qy,asi-Marital Rights to 
Same-Sex Couples, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 317, 318, 321-22 (1993). 
27 Jennifer L. Heeb, Note, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family, and the 
Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 347, 355-61 (1993). 
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created marriage-like entitlements for gay and lesbian partners, includ-
ing employment benefits and protection of property rights.28 
Recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court put a dent into the judicial 
consensus against same-sex marriage by recognizing an equal protec-
tion argument based on gender discrimination that would trigger 
heightened scrutiny of such a ban.29 The caveat is that, at the same 
time, the court rejected a due process argument much like that recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court in its heterosexual right-to-
marry jurisprudence, most notably in Loving v. Virginia. 30 As such, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court refused to extend the state constitution's right 
to privacy, expressly derived from the general right under the Federal 
Constitution, to include a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.31 
Nevertheless, the court remanded the challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the state's prohibition of same-sex marriage and subjected it to 
a "strict scrutiny" test.32 The court declared that the marriage statute, 
on its face and as applied, denies same-sex couples access to marital 
status because of the gender of the partners.33 Sex being a suspect 
category for purposes of equal protection analysis under the Hawaii 
Constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court, applying the strict scrutiny 
test, declared that the marriage statute is presumed to be unconstitu-
tional unless the state can show that the sex-based classification is 
justified by compelling interests and is narrowly tailored to avoid un-
necessarily abridging constitutional rights.34 
This opinion, which makes legally-sanctioned same-sex marriage 
a possibility in the United States, should be seen as part of a trend 
recognizing that the notion of the American family is continually 
28Id. at 358, 360. 
29 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). 
30 See id. at 57; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding state antimiscegenation 
statute unconstitutional because it infringed on fundamental right to marry; Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination). 
See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (striking down Wisconsin statute that 
prevented persons from marrying if they could not meet preexisting child support obligations as 
interfering with fundamental right to marry). 
Id. 
31 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated: 
We do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions 
and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate 
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage 
is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if it were sacrificed. 
32Id. at 67. 
33 See id. 
34Id. at 63-64,67. 
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changing.35 That notion has already expanded to include not just 
traditional heterosexual nuclear families, but also domestic partners of 
any gender with or without children, single parents with one or more 
children, and grandparent-led households.36 The underlying argument 
in Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe is that this change should be 
seen as part of a long historical and social evolution of the family 
structure, because marriage is not and never has been a monolithic, 
time-resistant institution as the Judeo-Christian tradition would have 
it.3' Rather, marriage is rooted in the socio-economic structures of the 
times.38 
Throughout its history, marriage has been viewed in varying ways, 
early on as a mere property arrangement, a form of extending inheri-
tance and dynastic rights, in which love was incidental.39 Later on, 
marriage became viewed as a passionate friendship and romantic rela-
tionship between two people, regardless of gender.40 Hence, why is it 
inconceivable that earlier societies recognized and validated same-sex 
unions when the prevailing social structures then tolerated such rela-
tionships? Boswell challenges contemporary notions of marriage by 
providing historical evidence to show what marriage was like in classi-
cal and medieval civilizations and how same-sex unions, proscribed 
heavily since the late Christian era, were accepted by earlier cultures.4l 
This evidence even shows that same-sex unions were vindicated by the 
Church itself in its earlier years through nuptials and ceremonies.42 
35 See id. at 67. 
36 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (holding uncon-
stitutionallocal ordinance selecting categories of relatives who may and may not live together in 
a single dwelling unit, because it "makes a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her 
grandsons"). See also Heeb, supra note 27, at 348; Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 
1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 925, 931-32 (1991) (noting that traditional nuclear family has been subsumed 
by range of alternatives, including single-parent families and cohabiting unmarried adults); Barbara 
J. Cox, Love Makes a Family-Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to 
Protect Nonlegal Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5, 5 (1991) (observing decrease in 
number of traditional families with simultaneous rise in number of alternative families within 
past thirty years); Alissa Friedman, Comment, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 
134, 135 (1988) (commenting that today's family represents variety of alternatives to traditional 
nuclear family, including unmarried homosexual or heterosexual cohabitation, group living, and 
single parent families). 
37 See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1422. 
381d. at 1421-22, 1485. 
39BosWELL, supra note 1, at 32-34,280. 
40 See id. at 280. 
41 See id. at 53-107 (chapter 3, "Same-5ex Unions in the Greco-Roman World"). 
42 ld. at 178-82. 
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Boswell's argument is valuable in the ongoing debate on same-sex 
marriage because the law claims that the same Western tradition is 
antagonistic to the idea of such unions.43 But if history shows that the 
"tradition" cited by the law does not actually support the purportedly 
tradition-based argument of the courts, then such a judicial consensus 
may in fact be misplaced.44 Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe chal-
lenges this consensus by offering a social constructionist history, a lens 
which "emphasizes the ways in which marriage is 'constructed' by 
society over time, with 'exclusions' from the institution being viewed 
as reflecting larger social power relations. "45 Professor Eskridge notes 
that this history has "argumentative power [because] it reveals [that] 
the traditional arguments against same-sex marriage [are] seriously 
defective: the definitional argument essentializing marriage around 
male-female intimacy is factually wrong; the argument from Judeo-
Christian tradition is hypocritical, given early Christianity's tolerance 
of same-sex intimacy .... "46 
III. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
A. Heterosexual Marriages in Premodern Societies 
According to Boswell, in the Greco-Roman world, unlike in the 
contemporary one, marriage was not seen as the method of being 
permanently committed to a "loved" one, because the notions of love 
and marriage did not necessarily go together.47 In fact, the idea of 
marrying someone for affection and emotional reasons was considered 
bizarre.48 Love came after the marriage, if ever it did.49 If it did not, 
husbands were free to turn to concubines for erotic and emotional 
fulfillment. 50 Unfortunately for women, marriage was the only respect-
able sexual relationship for themY 
43 See Eskridge, supra note 2. at 1420-21. 
44Id. at 1497. 
45 See id. at 1421-22. 
46Id. at 1422. 
47 See BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 39, 280. 
48 Id. (citing, e.g., XENOPHON, SYMPOSIUM 8.3 (expressing surprise that "Nicerates, I hear, 
loves and is loved by his wife"); PLAUTUS, MENAECHMI 129 (referring to amatores mariti as a special 
class of person); PLUTARCH, EROTIKOS 761E (noting astonishment at a husband being "in love" 
with his wife)). 
49Id. 
50Id. at 29-31. 
51Id. at 31. 
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Marriage as a social institution in premodern eras was primarily a 
property arrangement, facilitating the transfer of assets in a preindus-
trial world where wealth was held by families and was not redistributed 
through salaries.52 The only way to increase wealth was essentially to 
marry someone with a large dowry.53 Marriage thus was a way of expand-
ing the inheritance, especially for upper classes, and it served the 
purpose of perpetuating the dynasty of the ruling class. 54 Wives were 
seen as property in earlier patriarchal society, and only in the Roman 
era was marriage perceived as a merger between two families.55 
Because of this essentially materialistic view of marriage, men were 
allowed to find sexual satisfaction and even emotional intimacy with 
female or male concubines.56 In fact, this was an accepted practice at 
that time.57 A man could very well have a wife for economic reasons 
and, at the same time, a concubine for sex or love, without being 
viewed as immoral or promiscuous. 58 This practice was possible be-
cause ancient marriage entailed "fundamentally different expecta-
tions" when compared to modern marriage.59 For example, according 
to Boswell, 
Since Romans did not look to marriage to fulfill erotic needs, 
even a devoted and happy marriage did not depend on (or 
52Id. at 32-34, 32 n.20 (citing Susan Treggiari, Consent to Roman Marriage: Some Aspects of 
Law and Reality, 26 CLASSICAL VIEWS 34, 34-35 ("Money, political influence, social position, the 
perpetuation of the family were all bound up with the choice of partner"); id. at 33 n.21 (citing 
SUZANNE DIXON, THE ROMAN FAMILY 62 (1992); HANS WOLFF, WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN MAR-
RIAGES 78-79 (1939) ("The bride legally was considered as a mere object of the contract that was 
made by and between her [father] and her future husband")). 
53Id. at 33-34. 
54Id. at 33. 
55Id. at 41-42,46-47,223-25. The three most important consequences of this shift were that: 
(1) the woman's consent (not simply that of her parents) became emphasized as necessary to a 
valid marriage; (2) wives could sue their husbands for divorce; and (3) the husband's right to 
have sex with any member of the familia or all social inferiors was thence restricted in many 
households. Id. at 42. 
56Id. at 29-31, 55. For more on homosexual concubinage, see generally JOHN BOSWELL, 
CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980). 
57 BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 30-31,30 n.9 (citing DIGEST 25.7.3.1 (Roman legislation proclaim-
ing that having a concubine does not constitute adultery, "for since concubinage is recognized 
by law, its punishment cannot be legal")); id. at 31 n.l0 (citing JEAN-LoUIS FLANDRIN, FAMILIES 
IN FORMER TIMES: KINSHIP, HOUSEHOLD AND SEXUALITY 181 (Richard Southern trans., Cam-
bridge, 1979) ("In contrast to marriage, which was a social institution by which families of the 
same standing entered into an alliance to perpetuate themselves, concubinage was a personal 
union, an affair of love, at least on the part of the man.")). 
58Id. at 37. 
59Id. 
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disclose) sexual orientation (as it might in modern societies 
where people choose marital partners primarily for emotional 
and sexual fulfillment) , nor would it have the same significance 
for a Roman as it would for an American to be in love with 
someone other than his spouse.60 
429 
According to Boswell, procreation was not integral to the Roman 
ideals of matrimony and no one took childlessness as undermining the 
validity or reality of marriages.61 Only in the Christian era did the idea 
of marriage for procreation become dominant due to the Church's 
consistent and vehement insistence.62 Once Christianity's power was 
established, this idea was incorporated into many European philoso-
phies and legal structures as a Christian principle.63 Yet, despite its 
emphasis on procreation as the theoretical justification for marriage, 
the Christian Church nonetheless adhered to the basic foundation of 
pagan Roman law that consent and marital affection were the primary 
determinants of a valid marriage.64 According to Boswell, "heterosexual 
marriage was regarded [by the Church] as a compromise with the 
material world-a world Christians struggled, with varying degrees of 
commitment and success, to abandon-and its celebration and regu-
lation were left almost entirely to the habits, customs, and peoples of 
that world. "65 
Furthermore, even in the Christian era, the consummation of 
marriages was not encouraged.66 It was the "spiritual" companionship 
which mattered the most, and that is why, argues the author, allowing 
same-sex unions was not such a controversial idea.67 The primacy of 
spiritual companionship over sexual gratification is even written in 
ancient Roman marriage law to which the Christian Church later 
adhered: "Not coitus, but marital affection constitutes matrimony."68 
Understanding the nature of heterosexual marriage in premod-
ern Western civilization is essential to Boswell's analysis.69 Only with 
60 Id. 
6lId. at 49. See id. at 49 n.86 (citing Musonius Rufus, What is the Chief End of Marriage?, in 
CORA LUTZ, MUSONIUS RUFUS: THE ROMAN SOCRATES 86 (1947) (procreation alone could hardly 
justifY matrimony since one could produce children from any sexual union)). 
62Id. at 112. 
63Id. 
64Id. at 51,111. See also id. at 14-23. 
65 Id. at 111. 
66Id. at 111,119. 
67 Id. at 119 ("spiritual" presumably alludes to the union of the spirits of the spouses, rather 
than to their bodies). 
68 Id. at 51. 
69 See id. at 29. 
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such an understanding can the book's reader see that same-sex unions, 
which are largely affectional and for emotional sharing, did not really 
contravene the mores of the time, when heterosexual marriage was 
seen merely as an instrument of pecuniary gain.70 
B. Same-Sex Unions 
In the bulk of the book, Boswell presents much evidence of same-
sex unions throughout history.7! He argues that such unions were fairly 
common, and he substantiates his argument by citing the literature 
and history written during these periods.72 The evidence includes an-
cient biographies73 and ceremonies joining same-sex couples.74 
His premise seems to depend on key words and connotations 
which, upon translation from the ancient Greek, Latin, and Slavic, may 
be contentious.75 His translation is nonetheless persuasive because he 
rejects simple transliteration in favor of examining in depth the social 
context and circumstances in which a word was used. 76 For example, 
he argues that use of the word "brother" in ancient texts did not really 
signifY biological affiliation, as a simple transliteration would suggest, 
but signified a bond of affection. 77 This was because, in pre-modern 
Western societies, "brother" connoted a husband and a man's male 
lover, due to the attendant erotic and emotional attachments springing 
from the word. 78 In fact, because of these emotional connotations of 
intimacy, trust, fidelity, and devotion, being "brothers" was held in high 
regard.79 It signified that two men were from the same generation and 
social stature.so 
Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe also contains several biogra-
phies of same-sex couples, and also some historical accounts of customs 
by same-sex couples which emulated those of husband and wife.8! For 
70 See id. at 32-34. 
71 Id. at 53-107 (chapter 3), 199-279 (chapters 6 to 7). 
72Id. at 66--69,82,88,218-61 (chapter 7), 264-65, 280. 
73 E.g., id. at 147-61, 237-38, 252-53. 
74 E.g., id. at 180--88, 240. The appendix includes various examples of same-sex nuptials, 
translated from, inter alia, Greek, Latin, and Old Church Slavonic. Id. at 291-306. 
75 See id. at 19-26. 
76Id. 
77Id. at 19-25, 67-70, 221-28; id. at 70 n.84 (citing QUINTILLIAN [?], DECLAMATIONES 321 
("There is no greater degree of affection than calling someone 'brother'; how could a friendship 
be more blessed than to imitate brotherhood?"». Lexicographers have generally recognized the 
sexual, non-biological senses of the words Imter ("brother") and soror ("sister"). Id. at 68 n.78. 
78Id. at 19-26, 67-71, 129-36. 
79 See id. at 69. 
80Id. 
slId. at 53-107 (chapter 3), 218-61 (chapter 7). Boswell presents convincing evidence that 
these practices were perfectly acceptable and even vindicated. See id. 
1995] BOOK REVIEWS 431 
example, the burial rite given for Achilles and Patroclus, both men, 
was the burial rite for a man and his wife.82 The relationships of 
Hadrian and Antinolls,83 of Polyeuct and Nearchos,84 of Perpetua and 
Felicitas,85 and of Saints Serge and Bacchus,86 all bore resemblance to 
heterosexual marriages of their times.87 The iconography of Serge and 
Bacchus was even used in same-sex nuptial ceremonies by the early 
Christian Church.88 
C. Legal Aspects oj Premodern Unions 
Boswell argues that the law only played a part in premodern 
marriages in order to protect property rights, since marriage was, after 
all, a property arrangement.89 The law also enforced the marriage 
contract, which delineated the rights of the spouses.90 For example, 
Boswell cites a contract executed in Roman Egypt, which resembles a 
business contract and determines the woman's dowry and what she is 
seeking in exchange as consideration: among other things, that her 
husband promise to have no concubines or male lovers.91 Actually, the 
law today acts in basically the same way-as a device to assure the 
partners economic and social benefits and to protect their common 
property rights.92 Modern marriage bestows entitlements upon the 
married couple, as it triggers state recognition and protection of eco-
nomic benefits, such as inheritance, property rights, and tax benefits.93 
IV. HISTORY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
A. The Functional View oj Marriage 
Boswell's historical evidence seems to support a "functional view" 
of marriage as the legal framework for a committed relationship be-
82Id. at 59; id. at 59 n.25 (citing PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 180A; HOMER, ILIAD 18.80, 19.330-32, 
23.243-44; HOMER, ODYSSEY 24.77). 
83Id. at 64-66. 
84Id. at 141-46. 
85Id. at 139-45; id. at 139 n.133 (citing e.g., CORNELIUS VAN BEEK, PASSIO SANCTARUM 
PERPETUAE ET FELICITATIS (1936». 
86Id. at 147-51, 375-90 (translation of Passion of Saints Serge and Bacchus in appendix). 
87 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
88 BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 145-58. 
89Id. at 32-35. 
90Id. at 42. 
91 Id. at 42-43. 
92 Heeb, supra note 27, at 352. See also id. at 352 n.20 (citing Mary P. Truehart, Adopting a 
More Realistic Definition of ''Family,'' 26 GONZ. L. REv. 91, 92 (1991); Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, 
Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 539, 540 (1991». 
93Id. at 352. 
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tween two adults, regardless of gender.94 According to one commenta-
tor, ''viewed functionally, legal marriage is essentially a binding com-
mitment uniting two intimately related adults, a commitment which 
sustains the relationship between such adults by structuring their deal-
ings with each other and with third parties. Conceived in this way, 
marriage is indifferent to the relative genders of its occupants."95 
This functional view has been adopted by the New York Court of 
Appeals in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.96 In this case, the term "family," 
when used in state regulations to describe persons who cannot be 
evicted from a rent-controlled apartment when the leaseholder dies, 
was construed to include "two adult lifetime partners whose relation-
ship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial 
commitment and interdependence. "97 The partners in Braschi were gay 
men, and the Court of Appeals placed "the reality of family life" before 
a formal requirement of a marriage license, calling the latter a "ficti-
tious legal distinction."98 The Court of Appeals went on to say: 
The determination as to whether an individual is entitled to 
noneviction protection should be based upon an objective 
examination of the relationship of the parties. In making this 
assessment, the lower courts of this State have looked to a 
number of factors, including the exclusivity and longevity of 
the relationship, the level of emotional and financial commit-
ment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their 
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the 
reliance placed upon one another for daily family services. 
These factors are most helpful, although it should be empha-
sized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is 
not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship as 
evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the 
parties which should, in the final analysis, controp9 
This interpretation of marriage is consistent with a social construc-
tionist view. lOo The central theme of an historical perspective is that 
94 See William H. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE 
LJ. 1495, 1496 (1994). 
95Id. 
96 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49,53-54 (NY 1989). 
97Id. at 54. Although the holding in Braschi was confined to the construction of the word 
"family" in New York's rent control statute, it is undeniably an important step in the judicial 
recognition of the rights of same-sex partners. See id. 
98Id. at 53. 
99Id. at 55 (citations omitted). 
100 Compare Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1496 with Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1432-34. 
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marriage, like other cultural institutions, is a social and not a natural 
creation; this theme subverts the traditional definitional argument that 
marriage is, by definition, restricted to male-female partners.10l 
In addition, the functional view has its own support in history.102 
History refutes any argument positing that marriage has always been 
exclusively between opposite-sex couples.103 Boswell offers evidence 
that at the start of the Christian era, marriage was created by the 
consent of the parties, regardless of gender.104 The Church adopted 
this view from Roman marriage law, where consent and marital affection 
made a marriage, not coitus or cohabitation.105 Indeed, it was the parties 
that married each other, not the Church.loo In ecclesiastical nuptials, the 
Church merely served as a witness and was not the creator of the marital 
structure.107 If the parties intended to be married, then they were. lOB 
Aside from consent, early Christian societies also recognized that 
marital affection formed the matrimony. 109 In fact, marriage, regardless 
of gender, often drew an analogy with the notion of "brotherhood. "110 
Thus, as seen above, in the premodern era, sibling referents were used 
for spouses because fraternal relationships signified intimacy, emo-
tional attachment, and affection beyond consanguinity.lll Boswell's 
historical discovery reveals that such fraternal relationships were in-
deed similar to heterosexual marriages, which were collateral adop-
tions-that is, the wife was literally adopted by the husband-with the 
resulting creation of a unit where property rights were pooled. ll2 
B. The Procreation Rationale 
Boswell claims that procreation was not the primary purpose of 
marriages in premodern Europe. ll3 It did not even become a rationale 
101 See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1485. 
102 See id. 
103Id. 
I04BoSWELL, supra note I, at 50-51. See id. at 165. 
105Id. at 50; id. at 50 n.89 (citing the Roman code DIGEST 50.17.30) ('The classical formu-
lation of Roman law on the constitution of marriage avers that 'consent, not cohabitation, makes 
a marriage' (nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit)"); id. at 169 n.34 (citing Hans Julius Wolff, 
Written and Unwritten Marriages in Hellenistic and Postclassical Roman Law, 9 PHILOLOGICAL 
MONOGRAPHS 89 (1939) (discussing the law for Romans living under Burgundy rule, LEX ROMANA 
BURGUNDIONUM § 37: consensus perficit nuptias ("consent makes marriage")). 
106Id. at 165. 
107Id. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 12l. 
111 Id. at 129. 
112 See id. at 41,97. 
113 Id. at 49; see id. at 51. 
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for matrimony until well into the Christian era, when the Church, 
hoping to find a theological basis for this worldly social construct that 
was consistent with its exhortation of celibacy and the afterlife, ad-
vanced the idea that the propagation of the race was an acceptable 
compromise with the powers of sexual desire.114 Indeed, the advent of 
Christianity created an ambiguity over the emotional significance of 
matrimony, since the early Church emphasized celibacy over mar-
riage. ll5 
This history shows a degendering of marriage by challenging the 
current judicial consensus, a step that one commentator argues is 
important in the legal struggle for recognition of same-sex marriages 
because of the emphasis given to the remaining gender-based element 
of present-day heterosexual marriage, that is, its connection with the 
biological act of procreation. 116 Indeed, it is the prevailing judicial view 
that the purpose of marriage is procreationY7 According to one state 
court: 
The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal 
institution primarily because of societal values associated with 
the propagation of the human race. Further it is apparent 
that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of 
children by their union. Thus the refusal of the state to 
authorize same-sex marriage results from such impossibility of 
reproduction rather than from an invidious discrimination "on 
account of sex. "118 
Yet the argument that procreation is the cornerstone of marriage, 
or even that it is a necessary attribute of marriage, is flawed and 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which protects 
individual reproductive decisions.119 
114Id. at 280. 
115Id. at 110-11. Prior to this development, procreation did not necessarily occur within 
marriages. Id. at 49. 
116Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1513. SeeSkinnerv. Oklahoma ex TeL Williamson, 316 u.s. 
535, 541 (1942) (holding that right to marry was inextricably linked to the right of procreation 
because both were fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race). 
117Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1511. 
118 Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (emphasis added). 
119 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (upholding the right of married 
persons to use contraceptives, stressing the importance of protecting intimacy within the marital 
relationship); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending the Griswold holding to 
include non-married individuals, focusing on the importance of reproductive freedom not only 
to married people but also to the individual). It is important to note that in Eisenstadt, the Court 
endorsed the right of an individual to make family choices outside of the traditional family 
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First, heterosexual marriages never had a procreative requirement 
in the United States.120 Indeed, any such requirement would be too 
intrusive to constitutionally protected spheres of privacy.121 Encom-
passed within the constitutional privacy doctrine is the freedom of 
choice in all matters pertaining to reproduction.122 This the Court has 
articulated and affirmed in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, two cases which illustrate the illogic of simultaneously granting 
freedom over procreation and then denying a right to marry because 
of the couples' biological inability to procreate.123 Thus, it would seem 
that if procreation were the sole purpose of marriage, then all couples 
unwilling or unable to have children might be prohibited from mar-
rying.124 
Furthermore, one commentator argues that, although marriage 
seems to be the culturally and legally favored milieu in which to bear 
and raise children, an exclusive focus on biology is necessarily too 
narrow, because it ignores types of parenthood already existing in 
American society: legal parenthood and functional parenthood.125 Adop-
tion proves that it is not necessary for legal parenthood to mean 
biological parenthood.126 Also, an adult may fulfill the functional role 
of a parent by providing love, care, companionship, and education to 
a child even if he or she may have no biological connection to him or 
her.127 
The reality of family life is indeed so complex that biological, legal, 
and functional parenthood intersect with each other in many permu-
tations. 128 Through divorce, remarriage, cohabitation, second-parent 
structure. Heeb, supra note 27, at 386. But see Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that right to 
marry and right of procreation were inextricably linked because both were fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race). 
120Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1518. 
121 See id. at 1523. 
122 Heeb, supra note 27, at 384. Since any express federal constitutional guarantee of a right 
to privacy is nonexistent, Griswold held that there existed a zone of privacy, protected by "penum-
bras" and "emanations" from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See 381 U.S. at 484. See 
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that, although the Constitution does not 
explicitly mention any right to privacy, the Court has nonetheless recognized a right of personal 
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, in varying contexts). 
123 Heeb, supra note 27, at 387. 
124Id. 
125 Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1519. 
126 See id. 
127Id. 
128Id. at 1520. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, 78 CEO. LJ. 459, 
474 (1990) ("Neither biology nor legal adoption is sufficient to establish who is a parent in a 
complex world affected by cultural norms, technology, and patterns of sexual behavior. Deviation 
from the one-mother / one-father prescription for parenthood is common. "). 
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adoptions, and legal adoptions, a single family may have adults func-
tioning under some or all of the three types of parenthood.129 This 
crisscrossing can be found among same-sex couples, toO.130 In fact, in 
some jurisdictions, courts have approved same-sex second-parent adop-
tions, adding another layer to the innumerable ways in which these 
types of parenthood may intertwine. 131 Thus, a narrow biological view 
of parenthood, based on a preconceived notion of marriage'S procrea-
tive purpose, seems blind to the realities of parenthood in American 
society today. 132 Because same-sex couples do in fact participate in these 
realities by being biological, legal, or functional parents, a procreation-
. based argument decrying the impossibility of parenthood in same-sex 
unions does not have much credibility.133 
C. The Miscegenation Analogy 
Loving v. Virginia is the Supreme Court's principal case estab-
lishing the due process right to marry, but it is mainly an equal pro-
tection case.134 The right to marry comes as an alternative holding at 
the end of the opinion.135 The primary holding of the Court was that 
the Virginia antimiscegenation statute was a racial classification and 
that the state offered " . . . no legitimate overriding purpose inde-
pendent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classifica-
tion .... There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry 
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause."136 
It is easy to recognize the analogy between antimiscegenation and 
the prohibition on same-sex marriage. 137 Loving attacked a restrictive 
view of marriage based on race .138 Same-sex marriage attacks a similarly 
narrow view about gender and marriage.139 Gay and lesbian activists 
and commentators have therefore argued that by prohibiting same-sex 
marriage, states engage in sex discrimination, in violation of their own 
129 Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1520. 
130Id. 
131 See, e.g., Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993) (allowing 
second-parent adoptions by the same-sex partners of the children's natural parents); Adoption 
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 315-316 (Mass. 1993) (same). 
132 See Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1519-20. 
133 See id. 
134 388 U.S. 1 (1966). See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1504. 
135Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1504. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
136 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. 
137 See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1504. 
138Id. at 1505. 
139Id. 
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equal rights amendments and even of the Equal Protection Clause.140 
Particularly, since states will grant a marriage license to an opposite sex 
couple, but not to a same-sex couple, states are discriminating against 
the latter couple for the sole reason that the second partner is the same 
sex as the first. 141 According to this argument, that is pure sex discrimi-
nation, unjustifiable unless there is a compelling state interest.142 In-
deed, the Hawaii Supreme Court itself accepted the plaintiffs' Loving 
analogy with regards to prohibitions of same-sex marriage in Baehr v. 
Lewin, raising as it did an equal protection argument with regards to 
the marriage statute's classification based on gender, instead of race.l43 
Loving also struck down Virginia's antimiscegenation law because 
it violated Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 144 One commen-
tator observes that the Court's rationale, while confined to the issue 
of race, is relevant to same-sex marriage as well when extended to the 
issue of gender.145 According to the Court: 
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of 
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men .... To deny this fundamental free-
dom on so insupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subver-
sive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of 
liberty without due process of law. l46 
Cases following Loving seemed to emphasize that the freedom to 
marry the person of one's choosing is a fundamental due process right 
that cannot be abridged unless there is a compelling state interest.147 
140 [d. at 1424--25. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 95 (1993). See also Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the 
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 187, 232 (1988); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The 
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE LJ. 145, 147 (1988) (arguing 
that sodomy laws targeted specifically against same-sex couples, like antimiscegenation laws, 
violate the Equal Protection Clause because they rigidly lock some people into inferior gender 
and racial roles at birth); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE LJ. 573, 574, 589 
(1973) (arguing that prohibitions of same-sex marriage would violate then anticipated federal 
Equal Rights Amendment). 
141 See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1425. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. at 1508. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60, 68 (Haw. 1993). 
144 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966). 
145Trosino, supra note 140, at 107. 
146 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
147 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,96-99 (1987) (recognizing prison inmates' fundamental 
due process right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978) (holding that state 
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Thus, commentators argue, states violate same-sex couples' due proc-
ess right to marry by refusing to give legal sanction to their relation-
ships.148 For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court distin-
guished laws interfering with the decision to marry from laws through 
which the state exercises its traditional power to define the legal inci-
dents of marriage: 
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to 
marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation 
which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites 
for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the 
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly in-
terfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship 
may legitimately be imposed.149 
One commentator suggests that, under Zablocki, the state's power 
to define the legal relationship of marriage does not encompass the 
power to exclude persons from it, and therefore, a state may not negate 
the right of a same-sex couple to marry simply by defining marriage 
as a union between two persons of opposite sexes, any more than it 
could define marriage as a union of two persons of the same race. 150 
Virginia defended its antimiscegenation statute in Loving v. Vir-
ginia by invoking religion. l5l The Virginia Supreme Court asserted that 
race is a fundamental dividing characteristic created by God, and 
because of this ideology and the state's asserted interest in preventing 
a mongrel breed of citizens, the state argued that it was justified in 
banning mixed-race marriages. 152 Analogously, the prohibition on same-
sex marriage is based upon an ideology and a tradition of homophobia 
and rigid gender stereotypes.153 The Court ultimately struck down the 
antimiscegenation law, despite its long history and the nation's tradi-
tion. 154 Loving thus presents a principle that is relevant to same-sex 
marriage: "the right to marry is not circumscribed by longstanding 
cannot abridge person's right to marry even though he is unable to satisfY previous parental 
support obligations); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (emphasizing due process 
right to marry and to terminate marriage for indigents who could not afford payment of fees 
required by state for a divorce). 
148Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1426. 
149 434 U.S. at 386. 
ISOHohengarten, supra note 94, at 1507. 
lSI Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1505. 
IS2Id. at 1506. 
153Id. at 1507-08. 
IS4 See Hohengarten, supra note 94, at 1506. 
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legal or cultural exclusions from marriage, no matter how deeply 
rooted in the nation's traditions and history."155 
Some courts have attempted to differentiate marital restrictions 
based upon race from those based upon the fundamental difference 
in sex, using the procreation rationale. 156 According to this argument, 
the notion that marriage uniquely involves procreation and child-rearing 
should foreclose any analogy between the purported unconstitutional-
ity of barring same-sex and different-race heterosexual marriages. 157 
However, as noted above, the Supreme Court's marriage jurisprudence 
does not reflect the primacy of procreation in opposite-sex unions, but 
instead emphasizes the freedom of choice in procreation.158 Indeed, 
heterosexual marriages are not made invalid by the spouses' inability 
or lack of desire to have children.159 
D. The Moral Tradition Argument 
The history of same-sex marriage points to the illogic of banning 
such marriages on moral or religious grounds, especially those invok-
ing the Judeo-Christian tradition. 160 Eskridge emphasizes that it must 
be recognized that" ... 'tradition' is itself a construction and there-
fore an arena for contest."161 Courts have found themselves necessarily 
citing this moral tradition as compelling evidence to prohibit same-sex 
marriages. 162 They have attempted to show that limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex partners is justified morally, " ... to preserve family values 
and traditional ethical notions. "163 For example, the federal court in 
Adams v. Howerton linked its argument to the Judeo-Christian moral 
tradition: 
Canon law in both Judaism and Christianity could not possi-
bly sanction any marriage between persons of the same sex 
155Id. 
156 See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). 
157 See id. at 186. 
158 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441-43 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479,485-86 (1965). 
159 See Heeb, supra note 27, at 387. 
lfiOEskridge, supra note 2, at 1497. 
161Id. 
162 See e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd on other 
grounds, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1430 (citing Dean v. District of 
Columbia, No. 90-13892, slip op. at 18-21 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jun. 2, 1992) (invoking Genesis, 
Deuteronomy, Matthew, and Ephesians to support its holding that "societal recognition that it 
takes a man and a woman to form a marital relationship is older than Christianity itself')). 
163Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1429. 
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because of the vehement condemnation in the scriptures of 
both religions of all homosexual relationships. Thus there has 
been for centuries a combination of scriptural and canonical 
teaching under which a "marriage" between persons of the 
same sex was unthinkable and, by definition, impossible.164 
Yet a cursory look at Boswell's historical evidence is enough to 
undermine such arguments based upon a "univocal" Christian tradi-
tion.165 Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches performed 
same-sex nuptial rites for centuries, invoking Saints Serge and Bacchus, 
themselves same-sex partners. 166 These churches also published same-
sex liturgies glorifYing such unions and placing them in the same 
regard as heterosexual unions.167 
Some anthropologists and historians have interpreted these un-
ions as business partnerships and blood brotherhoods.168 However, the 
emotional and erotic ingredients of these relationships dispel any 
reading that they were merely for business arrangements or intertribal 
pacts.169 The fact that these unions were recognized and even given 
ecclesiastical blessing by the early Christian Church unveils the hypoc-
risy of arguments grounded on an ethical or religious tradition. 170 
V. CONCLUSION 
The most useful lesson from John Boswell's historical perspective 
on marriage is that marriage is an institution that is constructed, not 
discovered, by societies. This means that marriage at any point in 
history reflects the cultural and social attitudes of that time. Societies 
in premodern Europe, including early Christian ones, recognized same-
sex marriages, and therefore any argument prohibiting such marriages 
based on history or tradition is internally flawed.l7l Marriage is not 
insensitive to time, and since it is a construction of society, marriage is 
vulnerable to change. 
Boswell's historical viewpoint argues that the current legal and 
social consensus against same-sex marriage is necessarily restrictive and 
164 Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1123. 
165 Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1497. See BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 240. 
166Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1497. See BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 180-85. 
167BosWELL, supra note 1, at 180-85. 
168 Id. at 193-95, 270-79. Boswell offers summaries and his criticism of the findings and 
interpretations of these scholars. 
169Id. at 195. 
17oEskridge, supra note 2, at 1422. See BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 180-85. 
171 See, e.g., BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 56, 180-85. 
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reactionary because the consensus refuses to acknowledge that mar-
riage as a structure can be changed by society to take into account 
evolving patterns of relationship. Our society has already changed to 
expand the modern notion of the family, and the courts have begun 
to recognize a substance-over-form perspective on family.172 Indeed, 
functionally, same-sex partnerships have the sharing, intimacy, and 
commitment found in heterosexual marriages. The right to marry for 
same-sex couples would give legal sanction to the relationship, a legit-
imization not altogether new in the Western tradition. The granting of 
that right by courts and legislatures seems to be the next logical step 
in this social and cultural evolution. 
172 See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y 1989). 

